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Abstract. In cyberattack detection and prevention systems, cybersecu-
rity analysts always prefer solutions that are as interpretable and under-
standable as rule-based or signature-based detection. This is because of
the need to tune and optimize these solutions to mitigate and control the
effect of false positives and false negatives. Interpreting machine learn-
ing models is a new and open challenge. However, it is expected that
an interpretable machine learning solution will be domain specific. For
instance, interpretable solutions for machine learning models in health-
care are different than solutions in malware detection. This is because the
models are complex, and most of them work as a black-box. Recently, the
increased ability for malware authors to bypass antimalware systems has
forced security specialists to look to machine learning for creating robust
detection systems. If these systems are to be relied on in the industry,
then, among other challenges, they must also explain their predictions.
The objective of this paper is to evaluate the current state-of-the-art
ML models interpretability techniques when applied to ML-based mal-
ware detectors. We demonstrate interpretability techniques in practice
and evaluate the effectiveness of existing interpretability techniques in
the malware analysis domain.
Keywords: Cybersecurity, Machine Learning, Malware Detection, N-
Gram, Malware Detector Interpretability, Model Robustness, Model Re-
liability
1 Introduction
Adopting sophisticated machine learning techniques for malware detection or
other cyber attack detection and prevention systems in a production environment
is a challenge. This is because most of the time it is not possible to understand
how machine learning systems make their detection decisions. In the malware
detection domain, machine learning models can be trained to distinguish be-
tween benign binaries and malware, or between different malware families. The
advantage of using machine learning models is that they are less sensitive to
minute changes in malware binaries and can therefore detect unseen samples so
long as they are designed and trained to detect characteristics common across
seen and unseen samples. Furthermore, they’re learnt relationships can be used
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to determine relevant features for a classification, limiting the amount of data
malware analyst must sift through to determine the functionality of a malicious
binary. However, there are several drawbacks that must be addressed before their
full potential can be realized in the malware detection domain. Firstly, due to
the quick evolving nature of malware, the models must be made efficient to train
and update frequently when new malware families are discovered. Secondly, it is
possible to create specially crafted “adversarial samples” which take advantage
of peculiarities in the models learnt relationships to bypass the detector with
relatively inconsequential changes to the binary. Finally, given the high degree
of risk involved with classification errors, the models must provide a reason for
their decisions in order to improve performance and increase trust in the model
and its predictions. This last point is the focus of this paper.
The process of providing reasons for a machine learning model’s predictions
is known as interpretation. Interpretation in this setting should provide several
key benefits. Firstly, due to the high cost of classification error, a low false pos-
itive and false negative rate is a must, and therefore these systems must be
robust. A model is said to be robust if small changes in input do not cause large
changes in output such as a different classification Second, the high risk necessi-
tates a high degree of model confidence. Therefore, interpretation must provide
evidence that the model has learnt something which can be corroborated with
industry knowledge. This also goes hand in hand with the first requirement as an
interpretation which can show a model is robust can improve model confidence
as well. Additionally, the interpretation should aid malware analysts in down
stream tasks such as determining the functionality of a malware binary.
Machine learning interpretation can be broadly separated into two categories.
One is model agnostic techniques which are independent of the type of model
which they are interpreting and rely solely on the input and output of the model.
The other, which we will be using in this paper, are model specific techniques,
which use specific elements of the model such as learnt weights or decision rules in
order to provide an interpretation of a prediction. Interpretations themselves can
be divided into global and local interpretations. Global interpretations provide an
interpretation that is applicable across the entire feature space. Meanwhile local
interpretations apply to only a single example or a small subset of the feature
space. Some interpretation techniques provide only one type of interpretation
while others provide both.
In this paper we explore the interpretability of machine learning based mal-
ware classifiers in relation to the goals of model robustness, confidence in model
predictions, and aiding the process of determining the functionality of a mal-
ware sample. We train a logistic regression model, random forest, and a neural
network on a Microsoft data set containing the hexadecimal representations of
malware binaries belonging to several different malware families. We then ap-
ply model specific interpretation techniques to provide both a global and local
interpretation of each of the models. The objective of this paper is to demon-
strate interpretability techniques in practice on machine learning based malware
detectors. We also try to evaluate the effectiveness of existing interpretability
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techniques in the malware analysis domain in terms of their usefulness to mal-
ware analysts in a practical setting. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
only work which explores the application of machine learning interpretability
techniques in the malware analysis domain.
2 Literature Review
In the last decade, with the increasingly massive data sets machine learning
algorithms are being used on, and the growing complexity of the algorithms,
the prediction process of these algorithms has become so non-intuitive that tra-
ditional analysis techniques no longer suffice. Analysis being necessary for a
number of practical and legal concerns has caused research to now shift towards
machine learning interpretability.
Christoph Molnar [11] put together a summary of machine learning interpre-
tation methods in which he outlines a basic approach for the interpretation of
Linear Regression models (of course the same approach can be applied to linear
SVMs, Shirataki et al. [18]) where a features contribution to a prediction is the
product of its value and weight. For logistic regression he shows that when the
jth feature value is incremented by 1, then the quotient of the predicted odds of
the sample belonging to the positive class after the increase over the predicted
odds of the sample belonging to the positive class before the increase is equal
to eβj , where βj is the weight of feature j. Alternatively, this means that a unit
increase in feature j results in the predicted odds increasing by ((eβj −1)∗100)%.
He goes on to discuss the seemingly trivial interpretation of decision trees as the
conjunction of the conditions described in the nodes along a predictions path to
a leaf node. Similarly, for rule list models, an “explanation” is simply re-stating
the rule or combination of rules which lead to a decision.
However, the evaluation of a models complexity is closely tied with its expla-
nations comprehensibility, especially for rule set models, linear models, and tree
models. Given the following complexity definitions, the explanation approaches
discussed above could be too complex for highly dimensional datasets. Marco
Ribeiro et al. [15] define the complexity of a linear model as the number of
non-zero weights and the complexity of a decision tree as the depth of the tree.
Meanwhile, Otero and Freitas [12] defined the complexity of a list of rules as
the average number of conditions evaluated to classify a set of test data. They
referred to this as the “prediction-explanation size”.
There has also been work done on the interpretability of neural networks(NNs)
such as the Layer-wise Relevance Propagation introduced in [3] as a set of con-
straints. The constraints ensure that the total relevance is preserved from one
layer to another as well as that the relevance of each node is equal to the sum of
relevance contributions from its input nodes which in turn is equal to the sum of
relevance contributions to its output nodes. Any decomposition function follow-
ing these constraints is considered a type of Layer-wise Relevance Propagation.
In [19], Shrikumar et al. propose DeepLIFT which attributes to each node a
contribution to the difference in prediction from a reference prediction by back
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propagating the difference in predication scaled by the difference in intermediate
and initial inputs.
Moving on to model agnostic methods, Friedman in [6] used Partial Depen-
dence Plots (PDP) to show the marginal effect a feature has in a predictive
model. Similarly, Goldstein et al. [8] used Individual Conditional Expectation
(ICE) plots to show a curve for each sample in the data set where one or two
features are free variables while the rest of the features remain fixed. Since ICE
plots and PDPs do not work well with strongly correlated features, Deniel W.
Apley et al. [2] proposed Accumulated Local Effects plots to display the average
local effect a feature has on predictions.
The H-statistic was used by Friedman and Popescu in [7] (equations 44-46)
to provide a statistical estimate of the interaction strength between features by
measuring the fraction of variance not captured by the effects of single variables.
Feature Importance was measured by Breiman [4] as the increase in model error
after a feature’s values are permuted (a.k.a. permutation importance).
Marco Ribeiro et al. in [15] defined a version of the surrogate method which
can explain individual predictions using an approach called Local Interpretable
Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) which trains an interpretable classifier by
heavily weighing samples nearer to a sample of interest. Tomi Peltola [13] ex-
tended this work with KL-LIME, which generated local interpretable proba-
bilistic models for Bayesian predictive models (although the method can also
be applied to non-Bayesian probabilistic models) by minimizing the Kullback-
Leibler divergence of the predictive model and the interpretable model. This has
the added benefit of providing explanations that account for model uncertainty.
Strumbelj et al. [20] detailed how to describe the contributions made by each
feature to a prediction for a specific instance using Shapely Values, a concept
adopted from coalitional game theory.
Finally, there are Example-Based methods such as the method put forward
by Wachter et al. in [21] which produce interpretations by finding counter-factual
examples which are samples with a significant difference in prediction, whose fea-
tures are relatively similar to the sample of interest, by minimizing a loss func-
tion. The found sample is then used to explain what small changes would cause
the original prediction to change meaningfully. There is also the MMD-critic
algorithm by Kim et al. [9] which finds Prototypes (well represented examples)
and Criticisms (poorly represented examples) in the dataset. To find examples
in the training data which have a strong effect on a trained linear regression
model (i.e. influential instances) Cook [5] proposed Cook’s distance, a measure
of the difference in predictions made by a linear regression model (however the
measure can be generalized to any model) trained with and without an instance
of interest. Koh and Liang [10] put forward a method for estimating the influence
of a specific instance without retraining the model as long as the model has a
twice differentiable loss function.
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3 Method
Training and classification were done on a data set of 10,896 malware files be-
longing to 9 different malware families.1 The data set is discussed in [16]. Each
sample consists of the hexadecimal representation of the malware’s binary con-
tent. The class details are summed up in table 1.
Table 1. Class distribution in Data Set
Class No. Family Sample Count Type
1 Ramnit 1541 Worm
2 Lollipop 2478 Adware
3 Kelihos ver3 2942 Backdoor
4 Vundo 475 Trojan
5 Simda 42 Backdoor
6 Tracur 751 TrojanDownloader
7 Kelihos ver1 398 Backdoor
8 Obfuscator.ACY 1228 obfuscated malware
9 Gatak 1013 Backdoor
Based on other work on the the same data set, we decided to use n-grams as
features. N-grams are sequences of words of length n which occur in a body of
text. However, in our case the n-grams are sequences of bytes of length n which
occur in a binary. The length of n-gram we settled on was 6 because they were
shown to preform well in [14], however our approach can work with n-grams of
arbitrary length. We extracted the 6-gram features from the hex representations
of the malware files by obtaining the entire list of 6-grams present in the data
set, and the number of files each 6-gram appeared in. This resulted in over
2,536,629,413 candidate features. Next, any 6-gram which did not appear in at
least 100 files was removed from consideration, bringing the feature set size down
to 817,785. This was done because [14] also showed that selection by frequency
is an effective way to reduce the initial feature set size and a computationally
cheap approach was needed considering the number of features.
Next, feature vectors were created for each of the malware samples so that
a more sophisticated feature selection method can be preformed. This was done
by searching for the selected 6-gram feature in a binary and setting the corre-
sponding value in that binary’s feature vector to 1 if the binary did contain the
6-gram, and 0 otherwise. To select the features for the logistic regression model,
Chi2 was used because it can detect if a categorical feature is independent of a
predicted categorical variable (in this case our class) and is therefore irrelevant
to our classifier. For the neural network and random forest, Mutual Information
(MI) was used because it can detect the more complex dependencies between a
feature and a sample’s classification which can be taken advantage of by a neural
1 The data set was downloaded from https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification/data
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network or random forest. Since the feature set was still very large, the Chi2 and
MI scores had to be calculated in batches. This was done by splitting the data set
into 20 batches, each with the same distribution of classes, and averaging out the
resulting scores for each feature. Next, the features with Chi2 scores above 330
or MI scores above 0.415 were selected. This brought the feature set size down
to 8867 in the case of the logistic regression model and to 9980 in the case of the
neural network and random forest. The feature set size was determined based off
other work using n-grams to classify the same data set. We did not attempt to
find an optimal feature set size as our primary focus was model interpretation.
Next, the models were trained on their respective feature sets. To find the
best parameters for the logistic regression model and train the model, grid search
with 5-fold cross validation was used, yielding C = 10 and tolerance = 0.0001.
The value of C inversely determines the strength of regularization, that is, smaller
values of C cause more feature weights in the classifier to be set to 0, a value of 0
corresponds to no regularization, and values above 0 encourage the classifier to
use more features. Tolerance determines the minimum change in error, from one
iteration of the optimization algorithm to the next, that causes the algorithm
to terminate training. Similarly for random forest, finding the best parameters
and training was done with grid search with 5-fold cross validation as well. The
number of trees found to preform best was 300 and the and the minimum samples
per leaf found to preform best was 0.01% of the total number of samples. The
grid search with cross validation, logistic regression model, and the random forest
model were implemented using the scikit python library.
For the neural network the data was split into a training and a test set each
with the same class distribution. This was done because the extra parameters
in a neural network require a larger data set to learn more abstract patterns
and splitting it up into many folds might have stifled this process. The neural
network consisted of an input layer with one neuron per feature, an output
layer with one neuron per class using the sigmoid activation function, and a
hidden layer consisting of 40 neurons using the tanh activation function. 40
neurons was chosen because that number was found to preform the best after
testing with various other configurations. There were also no bias units to aid
in interpretation. The neural network was implemented using the Keras python
library.
After training and testing the three models, the logistic regression model
was interpreted by examining the weights used by the classifier. The random
forest was interpreted by examining the feature importance as well as using the
treeInterpreter python library [17] to obtain feature contributions to a particular
prediction. In the case of the Neural network, the iNNvestigate python library
by [1] was used to preform LRP to get the relevances of each node in the model
for interpretation. The balanced accuracy on the left out fold was 96.19% for
the logistic regression model and 96.97% for the random forest. The balanced
accuracy on the test set was 94.22% for the neural network. A discussion of the
model interpretations follows in the next section.
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4 Interpretation
Logistic Regression Model Interpretation
The logistic regression model uses a one-vs-rest classification scheme whereby
for each class, a constituent model is trained to classify a sample as either that
class, or not that class, and therefore we are actually dealing with nine separate
logistic regression models each making binary classifications. For this reason we
cannot preform the typical global interpretation of the overall multi-class model
by examining the weights since the weights should be different for each of the
binary models. However, we can gain insight of the importance of each feature by
averaging these weights across the 9 constituent binary models. For this we take
the average of the absolute values of the weights. This is because if a feature
contributes positively for one constituent binary classifier and negatively for
another, then the weights would cancel each other out during averaging which
would falsely give the impression that the feature was not important in the
overall multi-class model. Table 2 shows the largest 15 averages of the absolute
feature weights.
Table 2. Max 15 Absolute Weights of the Logistic Regression Model Averaged Across
All 9 Binary Sub-classifiers
Avg. Abs. Weight Feature
1.3151053659364556 0000000066C7
1.3480135328294032 008B4C240C89
1.4629237676020752 8BEC83EC10C7
1.4846778818947817 00000000EB07
1.5276044995023308 B80000000050
1.540535475655897 500147657453
1.5605614219830626 006800004000
1.6494330450079937 89852CFDFFFF
1.685741868293823 0033C58945FC
1.7235671007282005 8B91C8000000
1.781357432072784 034C6F61644C
1.8232074423648363 8BEC6A006A00
2.071327588344743 00E404000000
2.15007904223129 0083C4088B4D
2.1561672884172056 C78530FDFFFF
Looking at the table 2, we can see that three 6-grams are relatively heav-
ily weighted, 00E404000000, 0083C4088B4D, and C78530FDFFFF. Recall from
section 2 that for logistic regression, when the jth feature value is incremented
by a value of 1, then the predicted odds increase by ((eβj − 1) ∗ 100)%, where
βj is the learnt weight of the j
th feature. In our case we are using binary fea-
ture values where a 1 indicates the presence of a 6-gram and 0 indicates its
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absence, so we interpret the weights as follows. When the 6-gram corresponding
to the jth feature is present, the predicted odds increase by ((eβj − 1) ∗ 100)%.
One may be tempted to apply this to the weights in table 2, but these are aver-
aged absolute weights across all 9 constituent binary classifiers. Further, negative
weights do not cause a decrease in the predicted odds that is proportional to a
positive weight with the same absolute value due to the shape of the function
f(x) = ex − 1. Therefore, it would be inaccurate to say the average absolute
effect of some 6-gram corresponds to a (eavgj − 1)% change in the predicted
odds, where avgj is the average absolute weight of feature j. Thus a global in-
terpretation of a multi-class one-vs-rest logistic regression model using n-grams
in confined to vague statements about which n-grams are important based solely
off their average absolute weights, which is not very useful in a practical setting.
Next we will examine the max weights for a constituent binary model. This
will allow us to make conclusions on what features the model uses to detect
a specific class of malware in the data set. Furthermore, we will be able to
determine exactly the change in predicted odds that the presence of an n-gram
causes. For the sake of brevity, we will examine just the binary model for class
3, corresponding to the Kelihos ver3 family of malware, as all three models
performed well for this class but the same process can be followed for the other
constituent binary models corresponding to other classes. Table 3 shows the max
15 weights of the classifier for class 3.
Table 3. Max 15 Weights for Kelihos ver3 Binary Sub-classifier
Weight Feature
0.6438606978376447 000607476574
0.6438606978376447 000C07476574
0.6438606978376447 060747657444
0.6438606978376447 074765744443
0.6438606978376447 0C0747657444
0.6438606978376447 930644697370
1.3719246726968015 00000083FEFF
1.5114878196031336 E8000000895D
2.1067800174989904 0F85CC010000
2.3123117293223405 0A0100008B45
2.9041700918303084 000F859D0000
3.174276823535364 000F84700100
3.5334477027408613 0083C4088B4D
3.7941081330633857 034C6F61644C
4.391600387291376 00008B5DE43B
In table 3 we can see three 6-grams have relatively large weights. This means
these n-grams are most strongly associated with class 3 and in this case, since
we are looking at only the weights for a single binary classifier, we can use
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our interpretation from above. That is, when the 6-gram corresponding to the
jth feature is present, the predicted odds increase by ((eβj − 1) ∗ 100)%. For
example we can say the presence of 00008B5DE43B, increases the predicted
odds of a sample belonging to class 3 by ((e4.3916 − 1) ∗ 100)% = 7977%. At
first glance this number may seem excessive but in order to make good sense
of it we must also determine what the predicted odds of a sample belonging to
class 3 are when this 6-grams are not present, using a reference sample. For this
we use a zero-vector corresponding to a sample where none of the 6-grams used
as features are present. Since the dot product of a zero vector and the weight
vector is zero, we only need to take the sigmoid of the intercept of the binary
model for class 3 to determine the predicted probability of the reference vector
belonging to class 3. The intercept is -4.2843, thus the predicted probability of
the reference sample belonging to class 3 is sigmoid(−4.28426) = 0.01360. Next
we must convert this to odds with 0.01360/(1− 0.01360) = 0.01378. This means
a sample with no feature 6-grams present except 00008B5DE43B increases the
odds from 0.01378 by 7977% to 0.01378+ (0.01378 ∗ 79.77) = 1.11301 predicted
odds, or a 0.5267 predicted probability, of belonging to class 3. Thus we see that
because of the intercept, the large weight of this feature does not necessarily
guarantee a classification into class 3.
We can get a better idea of the robustness of the model by checking the
number of 6-grams which play a significant role in the classification of a sample
into class 3. This is because robustness is a measure of how tolerant a model
is to small changes in input. Therefore, if the number of 6-grams which play a
significant role is large, then a large number of changes in input will be required
for a change in classification, thus giving us confidence in the model’s robustness.
However, if the number of significant features is low then only a small number
of changes in input will be required for a change in classification, changes that
may be easy and inconsequential for malware authors to make. Thus the ro-
bustness of the model would be called into question. In our case, 20 features
have weights greater than or equal to about 0.59. 6-grams with weights above
this number increase the predicted odds by ((e0.59 − 1) ∗ 100)% ≈ 80%. Since
the predicted odds of the reference example belonging to class 3 is 0.01378, this
means about 11 such features can cause a sample to be classified as class 3 with
about 90% predicted probability. This may indicate that the model is putting
too much emphasis on just a few highly weighted 6-grams. To test this we can
reclassify samples belong to class 3 with the highest weighted 6-grams set to 0.
In our case, we set the nine highest weighted features to 0 for all samples. This
required 22863 changes to the feature array, and the result was only 24 more
misclassifications, 17 of which belonged to class 3, which has 2942 samples. Here,
we encounter a specification issue. Currently, there is no formally defined metric
to measure robustness quantitatively and once there is, a threshold for accept-
able robustness will be application specific. We leave a definition of a robustness
metric to future work, however, given that robustness is defined in terms of a
model’s tolerance to changes in input, and that tolerance to changes of insignif-
icant features is irrelevant, we can be confident that this approach can give us
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an idea of our model’s robustness. The models robustness becomes more clear
when compared with other models. For example, if setting the same number of
features to 0 in another model resulted in more or less misclassification, then we
can say that model is less or more robust respectively than our logistic regression
model Therefore, we can confidently say our approach gave an idea of model ro-
bustness for class 3. One can increase the model’s robustness by further training
the classifier with samples which have the highly weighted 6-grams removed.
This would force the classifier to learn a more diverse set of features which cor-
respond to class 3, meaning that more changes would be required to change a
prediction to or from class 3. Thus by observing the important features, we can
improve the models robustness to small changes in the input. A similar strategy
can be followed for the most negatively weighted features. If there are features
with too large negative weights, then a detector can be fooled by intentionally
adding these 6-grams. Further training the classifier by adding the large negative
weighted 6-grams to samples labeled class 3 will force the classifier to learn not
to negate positively weighted features with one or a small set of 6-grams. There-
fore we can conclude that examining the weights in the manner we have done
here can be useful for debugging logistic regression models leveraging n-grams.
This interpretation is still global in that it encompasses the entire feature space,
however, it must be repeated for each class. On the upside though, the global
interpretation doubles as a local interpretation as the relationship between the
presence of an n-gram and the change in the predicted odds holds across the
entire data set for each sample.
Furthermore, this method for finding important n-grams features can be
helpful in a practical setting as it can be used to aid malware analysts in down
stream tasks. A malware binary’s functionality can be more easily determined
by implementing a method which automatically disassembles binaries and high-
lights the code which corresponds to the most heavily weighted n-grams that are
present in the binary. This approach can also improve confidence in the model
if the highlighted code’s functionality is corroborated with industry knowledge.
Both these advantages require another interpretation step of mapping feature
values from the feature space to the domain space (i.e. mapping n-grams to the
corresponding code) which is not the focus of this paper. However, this can be
a problem for future work as it is not an overly difficult problem to solve and
as proof of concept, we provide an example of reverse mapping from n-gram
feature to code snippet in appendix i. The downside to this interpretation ap-
proach is that it is specific to logistic regression models only, and unlike models
such as neural networks or decisions tress, logistic regression models are not eas-
ily capable of learning more complex relationships between features and target
values.
Random Forest Interpretation
In the case of the random forest, interpretation is more difficult. It is easy in
a more general sense, in that we can get the feature importance scores, shown
below in table 4, and use these to determine what features are generally most
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important, but getting a more fine grained interpretation is a challenge as the
random forest is an ensemble of often hundreds of different decision trees.
Table 4. Max Feature 15 Importances for Random Forest
Feature Importance Feature
0.006877917709695 726573730000
0.007047751117095 7450726F6341
0.00723117607771 647265737300
0.007262894349522 558BEC83EC08
0.007377076296786 0064A1000000
0.007401045194749 727475616C41
0.007815881804511 A10000000050
0.008221953575956 75616C416C6C
0.008652467124996 634164647265
0.008657476622364 8A040388840D
0.008840768087294 69727475616C
0.008879491127129 89F5034C2404
0.00898170788833 7475616C416C
0.008987620418762 008A840D2F06
0.009011931204589 060000E2EFB9
Table 4 gives us a great idea of the model robustness. Since the total feature
importance is always equal to 1, we can be sure that the model isn’t relying
on just a small number of features to make predictions because the 15 most
important features only accounts for 0.9% of the total importance. Additionally,
the feature importance steadily declines without one feature or a small group
of features overshadowing the rest. Unfortunately, general statements about ro-
bustness which do not provide much utility to the malware analyst in a practical
setting are the most we can say with a global interpretation. However considering
a single example can give us more information, albeit only locally.
Interpretation of a Single Sample with Random Forest
With random forest, a local interpretation of a single example is difficult as a
classification decision is the result of a vote amongst many different decision
trees. However, here we find the tree with the highest predicted probability that
a specific example belongs to its actual class. Then we use the tree interpreter
library [17] to break down the contributions of each 6-gram feature. In our case
we followed this procedure for sample 4WM7aZDLCmlosUBiqKOx and found
that the 6-gram 002500000031 and the bias contributed 97.3% of the total fea-
ture importance. One may be tempted to think this means the model is relying
on only a single feature however this is just one tree out of many which have
heavily varying structures. Thus, changing this feature may not cause many of
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the other tree’s predictions to change, such is the advantage of using random
forests over single decisions trees. The significance of the resulting feature con-
tribution is two fold. Firstly, the model designer can find the code corresponding
to 002500000031 in the assembly code and determine weather the functionality
of the code corroborates industry knowledge. If it does, then this can be used
with other examples to improve model confidence. Secondly, by finding 6-grams
in the constituent decision trees of the random forest model which are signifi-
cant to a prediction, a process can be automated to disassemble the input file
and highlight the code that corresponds to these significant 6-grams, aiding in
malware analysis. The downside to this approach is that the random forest is
made up of many different decision trees, many of which should all be predict-
ing the correct class, so an automated process which collects significant 6-grams
from these constituent trees and highlights the corresponding code may provide
an overwhelming number of results. This is because well over a hundred trees
will be contributing at least a few 6-grams, meaning that potentially 100’s of
snippets of code will be highlighted to the analyst. Once again we are faced with
the problem of mapping the feature values to the domain, however this should
not be too tall a task and we leave this challenge to future work.
Neural Network Model Interpretation
For our global interpretation of the Neural Network model, we used LRP to
determine the most relevant input nodes for classification. LRP was preformed
in this experiment using iNNvestigate python library by [1]. First we found the
relevances of the input nodes for each sample and then we averaged the absolute
values of these relevances for the entire data set. This was done because one
input node may be positively contributing to one output nodes prediction while
negatively contributing to another, causing the input nodes relevances to cancel
out during averaging and giving false impressions about the feature set. Table 5
shows the largest 15 averages of the absolute relevances.
In Table 5 we can see two values had significantly higher relevances than
the rest, 000000000400 and 0000000000FF, and are therefore important for the
models classification. Additionally, we can see many of the features which appear
here are also in the top 15 most important 6-grams for the random forest. This
result partially validates our technique for finding important 6-gram features in
a neural network which to the best of our knowledge is a novel use of LRP in
this domain. This gives us a general idea of the importance of features used by
the model but, just like in the case of the other two models, we are still confined
to vague general statements about a feature’s importance. However, this time it
is due to the complexity of the model.
Next we will examine the max relevances for a particular class. In this case
we average the relevances for each node across all samples which were correctly
classified as class 3. Table 6 shows the max 15 average relevances for class 3.
In Table 6 we can see five of the features which appear here are also in the top
15 highest weighted 6-grams for the binary logistic regression classifier for class
3. This result also partially validates our technique for finding important 6-gram
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Table 5. Max Average Absolute Relevances
Avg. Abs. Relevance Feature
0.4204155570273673 24000000008B
0.438576163384531 75616C416C6C
0.4604056179848827 000400000000
0.6358686047042836 00FFFFFFFFFF
0.6414918343055965 008A840D2F06
0.6961477693970937 060000E2EFB9
0.7207968499760279 8A040388840D
0.7391062783969391 000001000000
0.7655264716760353 040000000000
0.7695977668414099 89F5034C2404
0.8623695409436033 416C6C6F6300
0.8762457266039623 6C6C6F630000
0.8811945910382549 69727475616C
1.1011308772023591 000000000400
1.129173981900078 0000000000FF
Bolded 6-grams also present in Table 4
Table 6. Max Avg Relevances for Class 3
Avg Relevance Feature
0.07849652902147494 060747657444
0.0858714786617495 8B0000006700
0.08840799934653523 07497357696E
0.09155762345728868 0C0747657444
0.09213969967088875 F10448656170
0.09360746295067239 00F0F0280000
0.09471450612061977 00F104486561
0.10572475395119978 C3008BFF558B
0.10603324133390207 009306446973
0.11341626335133194 000C07476574
0.11451772113662628 C38BFF558BEC
0.12097247805393918 930644697370
0.14448647700726405 04546C734765
0.1895982317973578 064469737061
0.24520372442763907 034C6F61644C
Bolded 6-grams also present in Table 3
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features in a neural network for a single class. In this case we are still confined
to general statements about a features importance for a specific class. However,
we can get an idea of the model’s robustness by setting the features with the
highest average relevances for class 3 to 0 for all correctly classified samples in
class 3. If the model relies heavily on only the presence of these 6-grams, then the
class accuracy will drop drastically, however if we have a similar class accuracy
as before, then it is unlikely that the features with a lesser average relevance
would have a larger effect on the class accuracy and therefore we can somewhat
confidently say the model is robust for this class. In our experiment the top 4
highest average relevance features were all set to 0 and it resulted in no further
misclassifications. Therefore we can say our model is somewhat robust for class
3. This result is somewhat helpful in a practical setting as a malware analyst can
use this technique to ensure the robustness of their model, but not much else.
Interpretation of a Single Sample with Neural Network
Next we’ll further explore the neural network’s predictions for samples belonging
to class 3 by taking the test sample with the highest predicted probability of
belonging to class 3, sample 4WM7aZDLCmlosUBiqKOx, and examining rele-
vances for this sample in order to provide a local interpretation. In doing so we
can see what the internal nodes are learning. First we determine the internal
node relevances for this sample. The library used for this experiment did not
have a built in method to determine the relevances of internal layer nodes so we
created a second neural network that was a duplicate of the last two layers of the
original neural network. We then obtained the value of the second layer nodes
before the activation function is applied when classifying this sample. That is, if
W 1 is the weight matrix for the connections between layer 1 and layer 2, and X1
is the outputs of layer 1, then we obtained X1 ·W 1. We then inputted X1 ·W 1
into our second neural network and preformed LRP to get the relevances of the
first layer of our second neural network which are equivalent to the relevances
of the hidden layer in our original neural network. The most relevant node by
a substantial margin was the 40th node in the hidden layer with a relevance of
0.61 and an activation of -0.99996614. Since this node is in layer 2 we will denote
it with n240. Next we created a third neural network that had two layers. The
first was identical to layer 1 of our original neural network, the second was just
the single node, n240, from the original neural network, and the weight matrix for
the connections from layer 1 to layer 2 of this new network is W 1(40) were W
1
(i) is
the 9980-dimensional weight vector for connections from layer 1 to the ith node
in layer 2 of the original neural network. In this way we were able to obtain the
relevances of the input layer to only the activation of n240 in the hidden layer.
Table 6 shows the max 10 node relevances for the activation of n240 in the hidden
layer.
In table 7 we can see that many of the 6-grams have similar relevance’s which
slowly decrease. This corroborates our results when examining class 3 as a whole
since the similar relevances across many input nodes indicates that many features
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Table 7. Layer 1 Nodes relevance to n240
Activation Relevance Feature
1.0 0.025721772 007300000061
1.0 0.027428055 230000001900
1.0 0.02751717 2F0000002300
1.0 0.029254071 270000003300
1.0 0.030343212 00870000009D
1.0 0.03163522 002F00000025
1.0 0.031697582 040000C00000
1.0 0.03176714 002300000019
1.0 0.032007236 00C0000000D0
1.0 0.034308888 007701476574
are responsible for a classification which is to be expected when a model is robust
to changes in the input data. One can automate the process of preforming LRP
on specific examples to find relevant input nodes, both for the entire model and
for a specific internal node possibly showing what the internal node is learning.
From there highlighting the disassembled code which corresponds to the most
relevant nodes can help malware analyst either determine the functionality of the
file or show that the model has learnt something which corresponds to industry
knowledge, thus improving confidence in the model.
5 Conclusion
In this paper we demonstrated techniques for the interpretation of malware de-
tectors which leverage n-grams as features. We’ve shown that it is possible to
interpret a neural network, a logistic regression model, and a random forest,
with the objectives of debugging and creating robust models, improving model
confidence, and aiding malware analysts in downstream tasks. For the logis-
tic regression model, examining the weights was all that was needed to meet
these goals. However, although straight forward to interpret, the model was less
expressive then the other two considered. The random forest required slightly
more work for analysis but it was also possible to get a meaningful local in-
terpretation that helped with the above stated goals. The downside here was
that the random forest interpretation must consider many of constituent trees
to be thorough, which can be time consuming and result in too much data. The
neural network interpretation was much more intensive but by using layer-wise
relevance propagation it was possible to determine the relevance or significance
of different n-grams across the data set, across a specific class, and for a single
example or for a single node. Thus, we were able to provide a global and local
interpretation which was somewhat useful in a practical setting since by using
these relevances it was then possible to get an idea of the robustness of the model
and build confidence or aid in downstream analysis of samples. The approaches
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outlined here all revolve around the idea of feature significance and can thus
be generalized to other models so long as there is a method for obtaining the
significance of each feature across the data set or for a single example.
Over all it was possible to satisfy our interpretation objectives for each model
but the ubiquitous trade off between the interpretability and the expressively of
the model was still present. Additionally, n-grams in and of themselves seem
slightly problematic as it is not easy to determine what a n-gram corresponds
to on its own, without considering a single example for context. So providing a
global interpretation of a n-gram in order to show what the model has learnt
is difficult. To this end it would be advantageous to include human readable
features as well or other features which can be easily interpreted in a manner
that doesn’t require examining a real specific example. For future work we will
focus on evaluating model agnostic techniques and enabling explanations in spe-
cific domain applications such as malware detection. Additionally, there is the
open problem of a robustness metric definition in terms of the change in model
accuracy when important features are “turned off”.
APPENDIX
Appendix i
In our experiment, it was possible to map n-gram features back to their corre-
sponding assembly code snippet. We could do this automatically using Python
regex to search for an n-gram in the hex representation of the malware binary,
obtaining the address of the n-gram in the binary, then searching for said address
in the assembly code .asm file.
Below is the code snippet with a 3 line padding on either side which corre-
sponds to the n-gram D0 50 6A 00 E8 B8 in sample 4WM7aZDLCmlosUBiqKOx.
.text :0063597 F 8B EC mov ebp , esp
.text :00635981 83 EC 28 sub esp , 28h
.text :00635984 8D 86 C0 FE FF FF lea eax , [esi -140 h]
.text :0063598 A 13 D0 adc edx , eax
.text :0063598 C 50 push eax
.text :0063598 D 6A 00 push 0
.text :0063598 F E8 B8 FD FF FF call loc_63574C
.text :00635994 83 C4 04 add esp , 4
.text :00635997 58 pop eax
.text :00635998 50 push eax
References
1. Alber, M., Lapuschkin, S., Seegerer, P., Hgele, M., Schtt, K.T., Montavon, G.,
Samek, W., Mller, K.R., Dhne, S., Kindermans, P.J.: innvestigate neural networks!
(2018)
2. Apley, D.W., Zhu, J.: Visualizing the effects of predictor variables in black box
supervised learning models (2016)
Interpreting Machine Learning Malware Detectors 17
3. Bach, S., Binder, A., Montavon, G., Klauschen, F., Mu¨ller, K.R., Samek, W.,
Sua´rez, O.D.: On pixel-wise explanations for non-linear classifier decisions by layer-
wise relevance propagation. In: PloS one (2015)
4. Breiman, L.: Random forests. Machine Learning 45(1), 5–
32 (Oct 2001). https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324,
https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1010933404324
5. Cook, R.D.: Detection of influential observation in linear regression. Techno-
metrics 19(1), 15–18 (1977). https://doi.org/10.1080/00401706.1977.10489493,
https://doi.org/10.1080/00401706.1977.10489493
6. Friedman, J.H.: Greedy function approximation: A gra-
dient boosting machine. Ann. Statist. 29(5), 1189–
1232 (10 2001). https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1013203451,
https://doi.org/10.1214/aos/1013203451
7. Friedman, J.H., Popescu, B.E.: Predictive learning via rule ensembles. Ann.
Appl. Stat. 2(3), 916–954 (09 2008). https://doi.org/10.1214/07-AOAS148,
https://doi.org/10.1214/07-AOAS148
8. Goldstein, A., Kapelner, A., Bleich, J., Pitkin, E.: Peeking inside the black
box: Visualizing statistical learning with plots of individual conditional ex-
pectation. Journal of Computational and Graphical Statistics 24 (09 2013).
https://doi.org/10.1080/10618600.2014.907095
9. Kim, B., Khanna, R., Koyejo, O.: Examples are not enough, learn to criticize!
criticism for interpretability. In: Proceedings of the 30th International Conference
on Neural Information Processing Systems. pp. 2288–2296. NIPS’16, Curran Asso-
ciates Inc., USA (2016), http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3157096.3157352
10. Koh, P.W., Liang, P.: Understanding black-box predictions via influence
functions. In: Proceedings of the 34th International Conference on Ma-
chine Learning - Volume 70. pp. 1885–1894. ICML’17, JMLR.org (2017),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3305381.3305576
11. Molnar, C.: Interpretable Machine Learning. GitHub (2019),
https://christophm.github.io/interpretable-ml-book/
12. Otero, F.E., Freitas, A.A.: Improving the interpretability of classification rules
discovered by an ant colony algorithm. In: Proceedings of the 15th Annual
Conference on Genetic and Evolutionary Computation. pp. 73–80. GECCO ’13,
ACM, New York, NY, USA (2013). https://doi.org/10.1145/2463372.2463382,
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2463372.2463382
13. Peltola, T.: Local interpretable model-agnostic explanations of bayesian predictive
models via kullback-leibler projections. ArXiv abs/1810.02678 (2018)
14. Raff, E., Zak, R., Cox, R.J., Sylvester, J., Yacci, P., Ward, R., Tracy, A., McLean,
M., Nicholas, C.: An investigation of byte n-gram features for malware classifica-
tion. Journal of Computer Virology and Hacking Techniques 14, 1–20 (2016)
15. Ribeiro, M.T., Singh, S., Guestrin, C.: ”why should i trust you?”: Explaining the
predictions of any classifier. In: Proceedings of the 22Nd ACM SIGKDD Interna-
tional Conference on Knowledge Discovery and Data Mining. pp. 1135–1144. KDD
’16, ACM, New York, NY, USA (2016). https://doi.org/10.1145/2939672.2939778,
http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/2939672.2939778
16. Ronen, R., Radu, M., Feuerstein, C., Yom-Tov, E., Ahmadi, M.: Microsoft malware
classification challenge (2018)
17. Saabas, A.: Treeinterpreter. https://github.com/andosa/treeinterpreter
(2015)
18 W. Briguglio et al.
18. Shirataki, S., Yamaguchi, S.: A study on interpretability of decision of machine
learning. In: 2017 IEEE International Conference on Big Data (Big Data). pp.
4830–4831 (Dec 2017). https://doi.org/10.1109/BigData.2017.8258557
19. Shrikumar, A., Greenside, P., Kundaje, A.: Learning important features through
propagating activation differences. ArXiv abs/1704.02685 (2017)
20. Strumbelj, E., Kononenko, I.: An efficient explanation of individual classi-
fications using game theory. J. Mach. Learn. Res. 11, 1–18 (Mar 2010),
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1756006.1756007
21. Wachter, S., Mittelstadt, B.D., Russell, C.: Counterfactual explanations without
opening the black box: Automated decisions and the gdpr. ArXiv abs/1711.00399
(2017)
